Predicting utility under satiation and habituation

We introduce a modification of the discounted utility model that accounts for both habituation and satiation in intertemporal choice. Habituation level and satiation level are state variables that induce changes in preferences as those states vary. We examine several properties of our model, discuss willingness to pay for an additional unit of consumption, and characterize the optimal consumption path. Predicted utility under projection bias and narrow bracketing is compared to actual realized utility. We argue that projection bias and narrow bracketing successfully explain the hedonic treadmill in the research area of happiness and life satisfaction.Time preference; discounted utility; habituation; satiation; local substitution; well-being; life satisfaction;

Does more money buy you more happiness?

Why do we believe that more money will buy us more happiness (when in fact it does not)? In this paper, we propose a model to explain this puzzle. The model incorporates both adaptation and social comparison. A rational person who fully accounts for the dynamics of these factors would indeed buy more happiness with money. We argue that projection bias, that is, the tendency to project into the future our current reference levels, precludes subjects from correctly calculating the utility obtained from consumption. Projection bias has two effects. First, it makes people overrate the happiness that they will obtain from money. Second, it makes people misallocate the consumption budget by consuming too much at the beginning of the planning horizon, or consuming too much of adaptive goods.Happiness; Life Satisfaction; Social Comparison; Consumer Life-Cycle Planning; Projection Bias;

The Retrospective Evaluation of Payment Sequences: Duration Neglect and Peak-and-End-Effects

In this paper we present experimental research examining the ability of individuals to make good retrospective evaluations of payment sequences. Inspired by the evidence on systematic biases in the retrospective evaluation of affective episodes involving pain and pleasure we designed choice scenarios for payment sequences in which the existence of peak and end effects as well as duration neglect could be examined. There are two main results: We do not observe a systematic impact of payment sequence features (other than its sum) on the choices if subjects merely get delivered the payments without any affection or effort. Subjects, by and large, choose the sequence with the highest total payment. In a second scenario, in which payments were linked to the subjects? effort and performance in strenuous tasks, we observe a strong effect of duration neglect and a weaker, but still significant end effect. We further find that the mere number of peak losses in a sequence strongly influences its attractiveness. In this scenario subjects do not often choose the sequence with the highest total payment.

Introduction to Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis and Support Systems Minitrack

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The retrospective evaluation of payment sequences : duration neglects and peak-and-end-effects

In this paper we present experimental research examining the ability of individuals to make good retrospective evaluations of payment sequences. Inspired by the evidence on systematic biases in the retrospective evaluation of affective episodes involving pain and pleasure we designed choice scenarios for payment sequences in which the existence of peak and end effects as well as duration neglect could be examined. There are two main results: We do not observe a systematic impact of payment sequence features (other than its sum) on the choices if subjects merely get delivered the payments without any affection or effort. Subjects, by and large, choose the sequence with the highest total payment. In a second scenario, in which payments were linked to the subjects? effort and performance in strenuous tasks, we observe a strong effect of duration neglect and a weaker, but still significant end effect. We further find that the mere number of peak losses in a sequence strongly influences its attractiveness. In this scenario subjects do not often choose the sequence with the highest total payment

A Simple Axiomatization of Nonadditive Expected Utility

This paper provides an extension of Savage's subjective expected utility theory for decisions under uncertainty. It includes in the set of events both unambiguous events for which probabilities are additive and ambiguous events for which probabilities are permitted to be nonadditive. The main axiom is cumulative dominance, which adapts stochastic dominance to decision making under uncertainty. We derive a Choquet expected utility representation and show that a modification of cumulative dominance leads to the classical expected utility representation. The relationship of our approach with that of Schmeidler, who uses a two-stage formulation to derive Choquet expected utility, is also explored. Our work may be viewed as a unification of Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa (1987)

A Single-Stage Approach to Anscombe and Aumann's Expected Utility

Anscombe and Aumann showed that if one accepts the existence of a physical randomizing device such as a roulette wheel then Savage's derivation of subjective expected utility can be considerably simplified. They, however, invoked compound gambles to define their axioms. We demonstrate that the subjective expected utility derivation can be further simplified and need not invoke compound gambles. Our simplification is obtained by closely following the steps by which probabilities and utilities are elicited

Happiness and time allocation

We consider a resource allocation problem in which time is the principal resource. Utility is derived from time-consuming leisure activities, as well as from consumption. To acquire consumption, time needs to be allocated to income generating activities (i.e., work). Leisure (e.g., social relationships, family and rest) is considered a basic good, and its utility is evaluated using the Discounted Utility Model. Consumption is adaptive and its utility is evaluated using a reference-dependent model. Key empirical findings in the happiness literature can be explained by our time allocation model. Further, we examine the impact of projection bias on time allocation between work and leisure. Projection bias causes individuals to overrate the utility derived from income; consequently, individuals may allocate more than the optimal time to work. This misallocation may produce a scenario in which a higher wage rate results in a lower total utility.Life satisfaction; Work; Leisure; Social comparison; Adaptation;